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SUMMARY
Since 2000, Canada has been remarkably successful in building a more competitive
corporate tax system, principally by lowering tax rates and broadening the tax base. Canada’s
marginal effective tax rate (METR) is now the lowest, and hence the most tax-competitive
among the G-7, the 20th most tax-competitive in the 34-member OECD, and 57th among the
90 countries surveyed in this paper. The result has been greater investment and improved
economic growth despite recessionary pressures. In particular, provincial sales tax
harmonization with the GST has heightened Ontario’s competitiveness and promises to do the
same for PEI, the latest convert to the cause. However, progress has not been uniform. Some
provincial governments have lost focus by raising rates or introducing tax preferences that
narrow the base, inevitably harming business efficiency. British Columbia’s decision to replace
the new Harmonized Sales Tax with the old retail sales tax will cost it dearly, especially when
it comes to public spending. On the other hand, corporate tax rate reductions of more than
30 percent (since 2000) have, contrary to the critics’ cries, failed to make an appreciable dent
in tax revenues thanks to multinationals’ habit of shifting profits to Canada to take advantage
of lower rates. This paper, in providing a candid snapshot of Canadian taxation measured
against 89 other nations, serves as an invaluable foundation for understanding how far this
country has come, and what its next steps should be.
† We wish to extend our heartfelt thanks to David Sewell for his contribution in assisting with
the drafting of this paper. We are also indebted to Finance Canada and Ontario Finance for their
comments and a very helpful report from an anonymous referee. 
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RÉSUMÉ
Depuis l’an 2000, le Canada a été remarquablement efficace dans la constitution d’un régime 
d’impôt sur le revenu des sociétés plus compétitif, au moyen surtout de baisses de taux de 
taxation et de l’élargissement de l’assiette fiscale. Le taux effectif marginal d’imposition (TEMI) 
du Canada est désormais le plus faible et par conséquent le plus concurrentiel de tous les 
pays du G-7, il se situe au 20e rang des régimes fiscaux les plus concurrentiels parmi les 34 
pays membres de l’OCDE et au 57e rang des 90 pays qui font l’objet de cet article. Il en a 
résulté une croissance de l’investissement et de l’économie malgré les pressions attribuables à 
la récession. En particulier, l’harmonisation de la taxe de vente provinciale avec la TPS a renforcé 
la compétitivité de l’Ontario et devrait avoir le même effet dans l’Î.-P.-É., la dernière province 
à se rallier à la cause. En revanche, le progrès n’a pas été uniforme. Certains gouvernements 
provinciaux ont fait fausse route en haussant les taux ou en proposant des avantages fiscaux 
qui restreignent l’assiette fiscale, ce qui a inévitablement pour effet de nuire à l’efficacité 
des affaires. La décision de la Colombie-Britannique de remplacer la nouvelle taxe de vente 
harmonisée par l’ancienne taxe de vente au détail lui coûtera très cher, surtout en matière de 
dépenses publiques. Par ailleurs, malgré les cris d’orfraie des opposants, les réductions de taux 
d’impôt des sociétés de 30 pour cent (depuis 2000) n’ont pas eu d’effet notable sur les recettes 
fiscales parce que les entreprises ont l’habitude de transférer leurs profits au Canada pour tirer 
avantage de taux plus faibles. Cet article donne un aperçu sans fard du régime fiscal canadien 
par rapport à 89 autres pays et représente de ce fait une base très précieuse pour comprendre 
tout le chemin parcouru par le Canada, et qu’elles devraient être les prochaines étapes.
† Nous souhaitons remercier de tout cœur David Sewell pour son aide dans la préparation de cet article. Nous sommes également 
redevables au personnel du ministère des Finances du Canada et à celui de l’Ontario pour leurs précieux commentaires et à un 
lecteur anonyme pour son rapport utile.
INTRODUCTION
2011 was difficult for the global economy because of the sovereign-debt crisis in the Eurozone,
slower growth in the emerging economies and stalled recovery in the United States. As a result,
Canada — the classic small open economy — also lost the full recovery head of steam that was
anticipated early in the year. Along with this global economic setback, the dilemma in directing
tax policy continues: while budget shortfalls are a driving force for more tax revenue, the
prolonged economic recession or weak recovery calls for fiscal policies to promote growth.  
One of the heated debates relevant to our subject — business taxation — is whether the
corporate income tax as a policy tool is more critical to generating revenue for fiscal austerity
purposes, or to stimulating investment for economic recovery purposes. Other political
arguments (e.g., businesses should pay their “fair share” as stated in an Ontario budget) also
play a role in this seemingly narrow policy debate. Policymakers with different views in this
debate may take contrasting actions in handling their corporate tax rates. Given the long-run
planning horizon for investments, however, corporate taxation should not be used as an arbitrary
policy tool for fixing short-term budget needs. Instead, it should be designed to support the
long-term economic prosperity that helps sustain government finances. 
Even with the political rhetoric of “taxing the rich and corporations” adopted by some political
parties in various jurisdictions, most countries have either maintained existing corporate income
tax rates, or have further reduced their rates in 2012 as part of a pro-growth agenda. The
countries reducing their rates include Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom. No doubt one
reason for this stance is that rate reductions have not hurt corporate tax revenues for many
OECD countries since revenues have typically risen faster than GDP, in part due to profits being
shifted into lower-taxed jurisdictions.1
This year, we are expanding our cross-country METR comparison from 83 countries to 90. The
seven countries added to our list are Estonia, the Philippines, Colombia, Venezuela, Kuwait,
Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The addition of Estonia completes our coverage of OECD member
countries, while the addition of the Philippines, Colombia and Venezuela completes our coverage
of major Asian and Latin American economies. The three GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)
countries add a new category of fiscal regimes to our business tax comparison, given their unique
historical image of counting more on oil revenues than general tax revenues, but having
undertaken some significant tax reforms in recent years that impact on non-resource sectors. 
As in our past cross-border tax comparative studies, we rank countries for their business tax
competitiveness as measured by their marginal effective tax rate on capital (METR)2 in a
descending order: the higher the METR as shown in our ranking tables, the lower the associated
tax competitiveness. In our 2012 ranking, Canada’s METR is the seventh highest and hence the
most tax-competitive among the G-7 countries. Similarly, Canada is the 20th most tax-
competitive among the 34 OECD countries (with the 15th highest METR) and 57th most
competitive among the 90 countries (with the 34th highest METR).
1 J. Mintz and A. Weichenrieder, The Indirect Side of Direct Investment: Multinational Company Finance and Taxation,
MIT Press, 2010, p. 140.
2 The METR is the portion of capital-related taxes paid as a share of the pre-tax rate of return on capital for marginal
investments (on the assumption that businesses invest in capital until the return on capital is equal to the tax-inclusive
cost of capital). We include corporate income taxes, sales taxes on capital purchases and other capital-related taxes
such as financial transaction taxes and asset-based taxes in our analysis. We do not include property taxes since
effective rates are not observable from data across countries. See the Appendix for further explanation.  
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We are also integrating our annual Canadian business tax review, based on the recently
released provincial and federal budgets, into our international cross-border tax comparisons.
With this integration, we will be able to evaluate Canadian provincial business tax
competitiveness from an international perspective. In a globalized economy, looking beyond
borders — both provincial and national — will help broaden our strategic view in an on-going
policymaking process.  
As in the past, to update our cross-border tax comparison, we not only incorporate the
legislated tax changes on an annual basis, but also update the key non-tax parameters by
country based on the latest statistics available. One such non-tax parameter is the country-
specific inflation rate, which in our current model is the average of annual CPI-based inflation
rates over the past six-year period (i.e., 2005-2011). The main purpose of updating the non-tax
parameters is to keep our latest estimate of METR — a forward-looking tax indicator — as
useful as possible for future investment and policy decisions. Also, we apply these updated
non-tax parameters to all the years contained in our latest model (i.e., 2005-2012) so as to keep
intact our tracking of annual tax changes by country. Doing so, however, may result in
variation in country-specific METRs for previous years between our current and earlier
publications. Such variation is understandable given the interaction between tax and non-tax
factors.3
CANADA’S TAX COMPETITIVENESS HAS IMPROVED REMARKABLY
Lowering rates and achieving a broader, more neutral tax base have been the principles
underlying business tax reform in Canada since 2001. Yet, at times, some governments have
lost this focus by introducing tax preferences that narrow the base and result in tax distortions,
thereby making the business tax structure less efficient and neutral. 
The federal government carried through with its last reduction in corporate tax rates from 16.5
percent to 15 percent, January 1, 2012. However, Ontario’s planned general corporate tax rate
reduction from 11.5 percent to 10 percent, which applied to non-manufacturing and non-
resource profits, is stalled until it can be accommodated fiscally. Given the severe state of
Ontario’s finances, it may well be years before any rate reduction will take place, thereby
somewhat offsetting recent gains in the province’s tax competitiveness. British Columbia has
also mused that it might increase the corporate income tax rate from 10 percent to 11 percent,
but only if fiscally necessary. We will discuss below whether these rate increases will have
much meaning in terms of revenues. Based on the evidence, we argue that the rate increase
changes will have a limited impact on government revenue, but will have a substantial impact
on long-run growth prospects. 
3 The other main non-tax parameter being updated this year is the country- specific GDP share by sector (i.e.,
manufacturing vs. a broad range of service industries), which is used to aggregate the sector-specific METRs into the
overall METR by country. This parameter has no direct interaction with tax parameters but reflects country-specific
industrial structures.
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3Sales tax harmonization has had a dramatic impact on tax competitiveness in the provinces to
the east of Manitoba that have adopted value-added taxes to replace their retail sales taxes. It is
unfortunate that British Columbia’s referendum in 2011 will lead to reversing its sales tax
reform by bringing back the retail sales tax to replace its newly adopted Harmonized Sales Tax
(HST) (harmonized, that is, with the federal government’s GST). This will substantially
increase the METR on capital in the province, reduce revenues for a fiscally constrained
budget and result in the repayment of the transition grant given by the federal government to
promote harmonization with its GST. On the other hand, the HST is well ensconced in Ontario
and the most recent news of sales tax reform comes from the province of Prince Edward
Island. Its planned sales tax harmonization with the federal GST will cut its METR from 29
percent to 11 percent by 2013, and move up its tax competitiveness ranking among the 100
jurisdictions — the 90 countries and the 10 Canadian provinces — from the 13th least
competitive to the 19th most competitive.
With the federal government having completed its tax reduction plan with the final 1.5-
percentage-point cut in the corporate income tax rate, the Canadian METR will be higher than
its 2011 level (18.2 percent) when the temporary accelerated capital cost allowance for
manufacturing and processing assets expires (an action which we strongly endorse) and the
reversal of sales tax harmonization in BC is completed (an action we think is regrettable). We
therefore use the long-term METR (19.9 percent) for Canada in our current year cross-border
comparison. This long-term METR helps provide a more realistic picture of Canadian tax
competitiveness despite the fact that it makes our 2012 METR ranking less favourable
compared to that for 2011 (Table 1, with further details presented in Tables 2 and 3).
Like the Canadian federal government, many national governments in other countries
continued or initiated tax reform plans over the past two years. The most decisive and
comprehensive tax reforms that combined tax reduction and base-broadening occurred in Italy,
New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Countries that reduced corporate income tax rates
without significant base-broadening include India, Japan, Jordan, Ecuador, Fiji, Greece,
Madagascar, Thailand and Ukraine. As a result, the average METRs for 2012 among various
groups of countries, such as the G-7, the OECD, the emerging economies in the G-20 and the
90 countries as a whole, all dropped compared to their 2010 levels (Table 1).4
4 Note that we do not include temporary tax relief, such as bonus depreciation in the United States, which tends to
change the timing of investment rather than increase investment on a sustained basis. Incorporation of these
temporary incentives would further reduce the METR calculations. Also, accelerated depreciation or tax credits that
are capped are not included since they do not affect the marginal investment. 
TABLE 1 MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATE ON CAPITAL INVESTMENT, VARIOUS COUNTRY GROUPS, 2005-2012A
* Canada’s marginal effective tax rate on capital is for 2014, when the temporary fast write-off for manufacturing and
processing assets will end and the reversal of sales tax harmonization in British Columbia will be completed. Without
these changes, the METR in 2012 would be below 17 percent. For individual countries, see Table 2 below. 
** The 10 emerging economies included in the G-20 are the following: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey. 
Notes:
a. The pre-2012 numbers differ from our previous report mainly because of the expansion of the number of OECD
countries (from 30 to 34) and our total country coverage (from 80 to 90 countries). As explained in the text, updating
non-tax parameters also made a difference to the calculations. 
b. Numbers may not add up due to rounding. 
c. While Japan reduced its CIT rate on April 1, 2012, France raised its rate for large corporations through a surcharge to a
level above that in 2005.
THE GLOBAL PICTURE ON CORPORATE TAXATION
Despite the recent epidemic of budget shortfalls, governments around the world have largely
acted on the consensus that taxing corporations should not be undertaken as an arbitrary
revenue generator for the short term. With very few exceptions, most of the 90 national tax
regimes in our study did not raise tax rates on corporations, and hence avoided disturbing their
business tax environment for purposes of economic recovery. Some countries even moved
forward to lighten business tax costs by reducing the tax rate and simultaneously improved tax
neutrality by broadening the tax base. The very few countries that did raise business tax
burdens did so by various means: some through surcharges, some through targeting large firms
and one on a temporary basis, all of which seem to be reflective of the international consensus
against raising business tax burdens.
The principal business tax reformers, which take a long-term view on corporate taxation and
stand fast on pro-growth and pro-competitiveness grounds, include Italy, Japan, New Zealand,
the UK, Jordan and Madagascar. Several countries also joined this pro-growth group by
reducing their corporate income tax rates to different degrees. 
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Canada* 19.9* 18.2 19.2 27.0 27.8 38.8 26.1 27.6 34.2 - 8.1 n/a
G-7 27.9 28.6 28.8 30.1 30.2 34.2 31.4 32.1 35.7 - 4.3 5c
OECD (34) 19.4 19.5 19.5 19.7 19.9 22.2 25.5 25.5 28.2 - 2.7 19
Emerging G-20** (10) 23.5 23.5 23.6 23.8 27.1 28.7 26.9 26.9 29.3 -2.3 5
Other Non-OECD (52) 16.6 16.8 16.7 17.5 17.9 19.8 24.7 24.8 29.2 -4.5 29
All 90 Countries 18.2 18.3 18.3 18.8 19.5 21.5 25.1 25.2 28.8 -3.7 50
Canada’s ranking by level of METR within various groups of countries, in descending order
G-7 7 7 7 4 4 1
OECD 15 17 14 7 6 1
All 90 Countries 34 43 35 16 18 5
Marginal Effective Tax Rate Statutory Company Income Tax Rate
# of 
countries
that cut
Change in general 
% points corporate 
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2005 2012 2011 2005 2005-12b tax rates
Italy introduced an allowance for corporate equity (ACE) taking effect for 2012 and
future years. The rate of return, or notional equity cost, for ACE is set at three percent
for the first three years. Italy also simplified its capital depreciation rules to broaden the
tax base. The combined result of these changes reduced Italy’s METR from 28 percent
(2008-2011) to 23 percent (from 2012 onward).
Japan reduced its national corporate income tax (CIT) rate from 30 percent to 25.5
percent effective April 1, 2012. When a temporary surcharge ends by 2015, its combined
national and sub-national CIT rate and METR will drop to 34.6 percent and 27.5
percent, respectively, from their pre-2012 levels of 39.5 percent and 32 percent.
New Zealand’s tax reform took effect in 2011: A two-percentage-point cut in the CIT rate
(from 30 percent to 28 percent) was combined with putting an end to a previously
excessive generation depreciation allowance. This reform helped improve tax neutrality
in New Zealand while preserving the country’s relative tax competitiveness, as
measured by the METR of 22 percent.
The UK has taken major steps to reform its CIT tax structure by drastically reducing the
CIT rate, while broadening the CIT base through eliminating depreciation allowances
for buildings and simplifying and reducing such allowances for non-building assets,
which include engineering features of industrial buildings. The company income tax rate
has been reduced from 28 percent, first to 26 percent (in 2011) and then to 24 percent
(2012). It will be ultimately reduced to 22 percent in 2014. This reform will reduce the
UK’s METR from 28.8 percent (in 2010) to 24.5 percent (in 2014). 
Jordan unified its two-tier CIT rates for non-financial sectors in 2010 and reduced the
CIT rate to 14 percent (from previously being 15 percent and 25 percent). This long-
awaited tax reform significantly reduced Jordan’s METR for non-financial sectors from
the previous rate of 18.8 percent to 9.5 percent.
Madagascar has been steadily cutting its CIT rate since 2008 from 30 percent to 22
percent for 2011 and 21 percent for 2012. As a result, its METR dropped steadily from
20 percent in 2007 to 13 percent for 2012.
Fiji reduced its CIT rate from 28 percent to 20 percent, effective in 2012 which reduced
its METR from 20 percent (2011) to 14 percent. 
Thailand reduced its top CIT rate from 30 percent to 23 percent effective January 1,
2012, and will further reduce it to 20 percent as of January 1, 2013. Its METR has
accordingly dropped from the previous level of 17 percent to 12 percent for 2012.
Ukraine reduced its CIT rate successively over 2011-12, by two points per year, from
25 percent to 21 percent. This tax reduction, combined with its existing generous
depreciation allowance, yields a very low METR of six percent (vs. eight percent before
2011).
Other countries that reduced their combined CIT rates include Ecuador (from 25 percent
to 23 percent over 2011-12), Greece (from 24 percent to 20 percent for 2011 and
onward) and India (from 33.99 percent to 32.45 percent).
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It is also noteworthy that two of the three GCC countries newly added to our survey —
Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia — have taken significant steps to reform their tax systems.
GCC countries generally tax only foreign companies (including the foreign share of joint
companies) under their corporate income tax system, with domestic firms being subject to a
religious levy (the Zakat). Multi-tiered tax rates with excessively high top rates (e.g., 55
percent in Kuwait) were the norm in the past even for non-resource companies. But Kuwait in
2008 replaced its 11-tier rate structure with a flat rate of 15 percent for non-resource
companies. Similarly, Qatar replaced its seven-tier rate structure in 2009 with a 10 percent flat
rate for non-resource foreign companies. In Saudi Arabia, the flat rate has been 20 percent for
non-resource foreign companies since before 2005. 
Among the 10 emerging economies within the G-20, the main tax reformers over the past eight
years include China and Turkey. China in 2009 adopted a true value-added tax applicable to
business transactions that refunds VAT paid on the purchase of capital goods. The result was a
27-percentage-point drop in its METR from the previous 45.3 percent to the current 18.5
percent. Turkey reduced its corporate income tax rate by 10 percentage points in 2006, which,
combined with its generous depreciation allowances, almost halved its METR from 11 percent
in 2005 to 5.7 percent. India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa also reduced, to various
degrees, their corporate income tax rates and, as a result, improved their tax competitiveness.
Countries that introduced tax hikes on business sectors include France, Iceland, Israel,
Luxemburg, Portugal, Colombia and Egypt.5 Some of these tax increases have taken the form
of surcharges under various names (e.g., the increased social security surcharge in France, the
unemployment fund surcharge in Luxemburg and the net-worth tax surcharge in Colombia) and
some of them target only large firms (e.g., in France and Egypt). 
With all the aforementioned changes, the average METRs in 2012 among various groups of
countries all dropped from their 2010 levels (Tables 1-2). They will drop further in future years
as some countries complete planned tax rate reductions  (e.g., Australia, Thailand and the UK)
and others possibly move toward much-needed tax reform (e.g., the US). 
5 Chile also temporarily raised its CIT rate by three percentage points in 2011, but reduced it by 1.5 percentage points
in 2012 and will restore it to its long-term level of 17 percent by 2013. We therefore ignore this temporary rate
adjustment for Chile.
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TABLE 2 MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATE ON CAPITAL INVESTMENT, OECD COUNTRIES, 2005 – 2012 
*With G-7 countries in bold.
7
US 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.9 35.9 35.9 36.2 36.2 39.2 39.3 -0.1
France 35.1 35.1 33.9 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.4 36.1 35.0 1.2
Japan 30.4 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 36.8 39.5 -2.7
Korea 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 32.6 32.6 32.6 32.6 24.2 27.5 -3.3
UK 26.7 26.9 28.8 28.7 28.5 29.7 29.7 29.7 24.0 30.0 -6.0
Spain 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 28.4 30.6 30.6 30.0 35.0 -5.0
Australia 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 30.0 30.0 0.0
Austria 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 25.0 25.0 0.0
Germany 24.6 24.6 24.6 24.6 24.6 34.2 34.2 34.2 30.2 38.9 -8.7
Norway 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 28.0 28.0 0.0
Italy 23.2 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.8 33.1 33.1 33.1 27.5 33.0 -5.5
Portugal 23.0 21.0 21.0 18.9 18.9 18.9 19.8 19.8 31.5 27.5 4.0
New Zealand 21.7 21.7 18.3 18.3 18.3 20.6 20.6 20.6 28.0 33.0 -5.0
Sweden 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 26.3 28.0 -1.7
Canada 19.9 18.2 19.2 27.0 27.8 30.6 36.1 38.8 26.1 34.2 -8.0
Denmark 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 21.4 21.4 25.0 28.0 -3.0
Finland 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 26.0 26.0 0.0
Switzerland 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8 18.2 18.2 18.2 21.2 21.3 -0.1
Mexico 17.5 17.5 17.5 16.1 16.1 16.1 16.8 17.5 30.0 30.0 0.0
Netherlands 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.3 20.5 22.1 25.0 31.5 -6.5
Belgium 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 16.5 16.5 23.3 34.0 34.0 0.0
Luxembourg 17.1 17.1 16.9 16.9 18.5 19.4 19.4 19.9 28.8 30.4 -1.6
Hungary 16.6 16.6 16.6 17.1 17.1 17.1 15.7 15.1 19.0 16.0 3.0
Israel 15.0 14.3 15.0 15.7 16.4 17.9 19.4 19.4 25.0 34.0 -9.0
Poland 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 19.0 19.0 0.0
Iceland 14.2 14.2 12.7 10.5 10.5 12.7 12.7 18.0 20.0 18.0 2.0
Slovak Republic 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 19.0 19.0 0.0
Czech Rep 12.7 12.7 12.7 13.5 14.2 16.5 16.5 18.0 19.0 26.0 -7.0
Slovenia 11.9 11.9 11.9 12.6 13.3 14.0 14.7 15.4 20.0 25.0 -5.0
Estonia 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.9 12.5 13.0 21.0 24.0 -3.0
Greece 11.3 11.3 13.2 13.7 13.7 13.7 15.9 17.6 20.0 32.0 -12.0
Ireland 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 12.5 12.5 0.0
Chile 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.9 7.2 7.3 7.3 18.5 17.0 1.5
Turkey 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 10.9 20.0 30.0 -10.0
OECD Average 19.4 19.5 19.5 19.7 19.9 20.9 21.4 22.2 25.5 28.2 -2.7
Marginal Effective Tax Rate Reference: Statutory
Company Income Tax Rate
Change in
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2012 2005 % points
TABLE 3 MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATE ON CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN 90 COUNTRIES, 2012 VS. 2005
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Argentina 43.2 47.8 41.5 6.2 43.2 47.8 41.5 6.2 1 3 35.0 35.0 0.0
Chad 36.4 40.5 35.5 5.0 40.1 44.4 39.2 5.2 2 4 40.0 45.0 -5.0
Uzbekistan 35.7 39.2 34.4 4.9 36.5 40.5 35.0 5.4 3 7 16.3 19.0 -2.8
US 35.6 33.9 37.2 -3.3 36.2 35.5 37.2 -1.7 4 8 39.2 39.3 -0.1
France 35.1 36.8 34.8 2.0 35.4 37.1 35.1 2.0 5 10 36.1 35.0 1.2
India 33.5 28.1 34.9 -6.9 37.8 32.2 39.3 -7.1 6 6 32.45 36.6 -4.1
Colombia 33.4 35.8 32.9 2.9 26.3 28.9 25.8 3.1 7 23 33.0 35.0 -2.0
Brazil 31.6 34.0 30.8 3.2 35.1 34.0 35.4 -1.4 8 11 34 34 0.0
Japan 30.4 30.6 30.4 0.2 31.9 32.0 31.8 0.2 9 16 36.8 39.5 -2.7
Venezuela 30.2 30.8 30.0 0.7 30.2 30.8 30.0 0.7 10 18 34.0 34.0 0.0
Korea 29.9 32.2 28.9 3.4 32.6 35.1 31.5 3.6 11 15 24.2 27.5 -3.3
Russia 29.5 32.0 28.9 3.1 36.0 38.7 35.3 3.4 12 9 20 22 -2.0
Costa Rica 28.2 35.3 26.1 9.2 28.2 35.3 26.1 9.2 13 22 30.0 30.0 0.0
UK 26.7 25.3 26.9 -1.6 29.7 27.3 30.1 -2.8 14 19 24.0 30.0 -6.0
Spain 26.3 25.4 26.4 -1.0 30.6 29.7 30.8 -1.1 15 17 30.0 35.0 -5.0
Australia 26.2 27.9 25.9 1.9 26.2 27.9 25.9 1.9 16 24 30.0 30.0 0.0
Austria 26.0 25.9 26.0 -0.1 26.0 25.9 26.0 -0.1 17 25 25.0 25.0 0.0
Pakistan 25.8 29.1 24.7 4.4 25.8 29.0 24.7 4.4 18 26 35.0 35.0 0.0
Lesotho 24.8 13.2 28.2 -15.0 34.4 19.5 38.9 -19.4 19 12 25.0 35.0 -10.0
Philippines 24.7 26.1 24.2 1.9 29.3 30.8 28.8 2.1 20 20 30.0 35.0 -5.0
Germany 24.6 26.7 23.9 2.8 34.2 36.5 33.5 3.1 21 13 30.2 38.9 -8.7
Norway 24.5 23.3 24.6 -1.4 24.5 23.3 24.6 -1.4 22 29 28.0 28.0 0.0
Sierra Leone 23.7 17.9 24.0 -6.1 23.7 17.9 24.0 -6.1 23 31 35.0 35.0 0.0
Italy 23.2 25.2 22.7 2.4 33.1 31.1 33.5 -2.4 24 14 27.5 33.0 -5.5
Portugal 23.0 20.9 23.4 -2.5 19.8 17.8 20.1 -2.2 25 46 31.5 27.5 4.0
Peru 23.0 29.8 21.3 8.4 23.0 29.8 21.3 8.4 26 33 30.0 30.0 0.0
Bolivia 22.2 29.8 20.3 9.4 22.2 29.8 20.3 9.4 27 36 25.0 25.0 0.0
Tunisia 21.8 24.1 21.3 2.9 25.6 28.1 24.9 3.2 28 27 30.0 35.0 -5.0
New Zealand 21.7 22.5 21.5 1.0 20.6 18.6 21.0 -2.3 29 42 28.0 33.0 -5.0
Saudi Arabia 21.0 18.2 21.7 -3.5 21.0 18.2 21.7 -3.5 30 40 20.0 20.0 0.0
Iran 20.6 28.0 19.0 9.0 20.6 28.0 19.0 9.0 31 41 25.0 25.0 0.0
Indonesia 20.4 23.8 18.6 5.2 24.9 28.8 22.9 5.8 32 28 25.0 30.0 -5.0
Sweden 19.9 18.5 20.2 -1.7 21.3 19.9 21.6 -1.7 33 39 26.3 28.0 -1.7
Canada 19.9 13.8 22.4 -8.6 38.8 35.3 41.3 -6.0 34 5 26.1 34.2 -8.0
Tanzania 19.4 15.1 20.1 -5.0 19.4 15.1 20.1 -5.0 35 47 30.0 30.0 0.0
Kazakhstan 19.0 24.1 18.1 6.0 28.5 34.6 27.4 7.2 36 21 29.9 40.5 -10.6
Denmark 18.9 20.8 18.5 2.2 21.4 23.4 21.0 2.4 37 38 25.0 28.0 -3.0
Georgia 18.9 21.3 18.4 2.9 22.4 25.4 21.8 3.5 38 35 15.0 20.0 -5.0
Jamaica 18.6 15.9 18.9 -3.0 18.6 15.9 18.9 -3.0 39 50 33.3 33.3 0.0
Finland 18.5 20.4 17.9 2.6 18.5 20.4 17.9 2.6 40 51 26.0 26.0 0.0
China 18.5 21.5 15.8 5.6 45.3 47.5 43.4 4.1 41 2 25 25 0.0
Rwanda 18.2 27.0 17.1 9.9 18.2 27.0 17.1 9.9 42 53 30.0 30.0 0.0
Malaysia 17.8 19.5 16.8 2.7 20.2 22.1 19.1 3.0 43 43 25.0 28.0 -3.0
Switzerland 17.8 17.0 17.9 -1.0 18.2 17.5 18.4 -1.0 44 52 21.2 21.3 -0.1
Mexico 17.5 19.0 17.1 1.9 17.5 19.0 17.1 1.9 45 58 30.0 30.0 0.0
Marginal Effective Tax Rate METR ranking Statutory Company
2012 2005
in descending Income Tax Rate
order
Sectoral Sectoral +-%
Overall  Manuf. Services gap Overall Manuf. Services gap 2012 2005 2012 2005 point
(cont’d)
*With G-7 countries in bold.
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Netherlands 17.3 16.2 17.6 -1.4 22.1 20.7 22.3 -1.6 46 37 25.0 31.5 -6.5
Zambia 17.2 24.2 16.1 8.1 17.2 24.2 16.1 8.1 47 60 35.0 35.0 0.0
Belgium 17.1 16.3 17.2 -0.9 23.3 22.4 23.5 -1.1 48 32 34.0 34.0 0.0
Luxembourg 17.1 18.1 17.0 1.2 19.9 21.1 19.8 1.3 49 45 28.8 30.4 -1.6
Ecuador 16.8 21.6 16.0 5.6 17.4 22.4 16.5 5.9 50 59 23.0 25.0 -2.0
Hungary 16.6 17.5 15.7 1.8 15.1 15.9 14.3 1.6 51 69 19.0 16.0 3.0
Israel 15.0 13.2 15.3 -2.2 19.4 17.3 19.8 -2.5 52 48 25.0 34.0 -9.0
Uganda 14.7 9.6 15.2 -5.6 14.7 9.6 15.2 -5.6 53 70 30.0 30.0 0.0
Bangladesh 14.6 12.9 15.1 -2.3 16.5 14.6 17.0 -2.4 54 64 27.5 30.0 -2.5
Poland 14.5 13.8 14.7 -1.0 14.5 13.8 14.7 -1.0 55 72 19.0 19.0 0.0
Iceland 14.2 11.6 14.6 -2.9 18.0 16.4 18.2 -1.8 56 56 20.0 18.0 2.0
Botswana 14.2 8.3 14.6 -6.4 14.2 8.3 14.6 -6.4 57 74 25.0 25.0 0.0
South Africa 14.1 15.6 13.7 1.8 15.5 17.1 15.1 2.0 58 65 28.0 30.0 -2.0
Ghana 14.0 14.3 14.0 0.3 14.0 14.3 14.0 0.3 59 75 25.0 25.0 0.0
Fiji 13.9 17.6 13.1 4.4 22.9 28.0 21.9 6.1 60 34 20.0 31.0 -11.0
Nigeria 13.5 20.4 12.8 7.6 13.5 20.4 12.8 7.6 61 76 32.0 32.0 0.0
Ethiopia 13.4 27.0 12.2 14.8 13.4 27.0 12.2 14.8 62 77 30.0 30.0 0.0
Morocco 13.4 17.9 12.4 5.5 16.6 21.6 15.5 6.2 63 63 30.0 35.0 -5.0
Madagascar 13.1 17.7 12.0 5.7 20.2 26.2 18.7 7.5 64 44 21.0 30.0 -9.0
Slovak Republic 12.8 16.5 11.4 5.1 12.8 16.5 11.4 5.1 65 79 19.0 19.0 0.0
Czech Rep 12.7 12.9 12.7 0.2 18.0 18.3 17.9 0.3 66 54 19.0 26.0 -7.0
Vietnam 12.6 19.6 9.1 10.5 14.6 22.4 10.8 11.5 67 71 25.0 28.0 -3.0
Thailand 12.1 14.9 10.1 4.8 16.8 20.3 14.3 6.0 68 62 23.0 30.0 -7.0
Trinidad 12.0 3.6 16.8 -13.2 15.4 5.6 20.9 -15.2 69 68 25.0 30.0 -5.0
Slovenia 11.9 12.1 11.8 0.3 15.4 15.6 15.3 0.3 70 67 20.0 25.0 -5.0
Estonia 11.4 11.4 11.4 0.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 0.0 71 78 21.0 24.0 -3.0
Greece 11.3 10.6 11.4 -0.8 17.6 16.5 17.7 -1.3 72 57 20.0 32.0 -12.0
Ireland 11.2 10.6 11.4 -0.8 11.2 10.6 11.4 -0.8 73 80 12.5 12.5 0.0
Taiwan 11.1 13.3 10.0 3.2 16.9 19.9 15.4 4.5 74 61 17.0 25.0 -8.0
Jordan 9.5 11.5 9.1 2.5 18.8 13.7 20.0 -6.3 75 49 15.1 23.2 -8.2
Egypt 9.4 12.6 8.4 4.2 15.5 19.7 14.1 5.6 76 66 25.0 34.0 -9.0
Singapore 9.3 7.0 10.1 -3.1 11.2 8.6 12.1 -3.5 77 81 17.0 20.0 -3.0
Croatia 9.1 11.7 8.5 3.1 9.1 11.7 8.5 3.1 78 83 22.0 22.0 0.0
Kenya 9.0 -24.0 15.4 -39.4 9.0 -24.0 15.4 -39.4 79 84 30.0 30.0 0.0
Kuwait 8.7 9.8 8.5 1.3 46.3 52.4 45.4 7.0 80 1 15.0 55.0 -40.0
Romania 8.6 11.0 7.7 3.3 18.0 11.0 20.6 -9.6 81 55 16.0 35.0 -19.0
Mauritius 7.9 8.8 7.7 1.1 14.5 16.0 14.1 1.8 82 73 15.0 25.0 -10.0
Chile 6.7 7.3 6.6 0.7 7.3 7.9 7.2 0.8 83 87 18.5 17.0 1.5
Qatar 5.8 9.1 5.2 3.8 24.2 32.9 22.6 10.3 84 30 10.0 35.0 -25.0
Latvia 5.8 7.4 5.5 1.8 5.8 7.4 5.5 1.8 85 88 15.0 15.0 0.0
Turkey 5.7 5.0 5.9 -1.0 10.9 10.0 11.2 -1.2 86 82 20.0 30.0 -10.0
Ukraine 5.6 11.4 3.6 7.8 7.5 14.3 5.1 9.3 87 86 21.0 25.0 -4.0
Bulgaria 5.0 5.3 4.9 0.4 7.9 8.4 7.7 0.7 88 85 10.0 15.0 -5.0
Hong Kong 3.9 3.5 3.9 -0.4 4.2 3.8 4.2 -0.5 89 89 16.5 17.5 -1.0
Serbia -4.0 -11.2 -2.2 -9.0 -4.0 -11.2 -2.2 -9.0 90 90 10.0 10.0 0.0
Average 18.2 18.9 17.9 0.9 21.5 22.2 21.4 0.8 25.1 28.8 -3.7
Marginal Effective Tax Rate METR ranking Statutory Company
2012 2005
in descending Income Tax Rate
order
Sectoral Sectoral +-%
Overall  Manuf. Services gap Overall Manuf. Services gap 2012 2005 2012 2005 point
THE CANADIAN PATH T0 BUSINESS TAX REFORM
Canada has made impressive progress in business tax reform since 2001, when the federal
government started phasing in a rate reduction to improve Canadian business tax
competitiveness. This year, the federal government completed its scheduled federal corporate
income tax (CIT) reduction plan, with the final 1.5 percentage-point reduction to arrive at the
15 percent CIT rate. Provincial governments followed the federal initiative with various reform
plans such as eliminating capital tax for non-financial sectors, which plans were completed in
2012, reducing corporate income tax rates and harmonizing the provincial sales tax with the
federal GST. As a result of this concerted tax reform effort among all levels of government, our
Canadian METR for non-resource sectors has steadily dropped from 44 percent in 2000 and
will reach a level of about 20 percent by 2014. Had British Columbia not reversed its sales tax
harmonization, and if Ontario keeps its rate reduction plan intact, the Canadian METR for
2014 would be well below 19 percent, and Canada’s tax competitive status would be further
improved among the OECD countries and around the world. 
In the meantime, the federal and many provincial governments also took several measures to
improve tax neutrality, the most significant of which has been unifying the two-tier income tax
rates between manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, and reducing preferential tax
treatment towards resource sectors.6 The latest change in this direction, as introduced in the
federal budget for 2012, is to phase out the corporate mineral investment tax credit for
exploration and the Atlantic Investment Credit applicable to the non-renewable resource
sectors. Our simulations7 show that these plans, once implemented, will largely eliminate
existing tax advantages enjoyed by these resource sectors over non-resource sectors as a whole.
Impact on Investment
Corporate taxes impact on investment decisions by raising the cost of capital faced by
companies. As a result, based upon consensus empirical estimates, we assume that a 10 percent
increase in the cost of capital (due to taxation) reduces capital demand by seven percent.8 With
the reduction in Canada’s METR of 38.8 percent in 2005 to 19.9 percent in 2012, we estimate
that the effect of the tax reductions will be to increase the capital stock by $467 billion over the
long run, assuming all other factors influencing investment do not change. This is a substantial
impact, of which the realized portion has helped offset some of the negative impacts arising
from the recession in 2009 and slow economic growth that evolved afterwards.   
6 The resource sector is not included in our 90-country analysis. However, we have undertaken a recent analysis of oil
and gas taxation in six countries that is forthcoming.
7 These shall be reported in “Capturing Economic Rents from Resources through Royalties and Taxes,” mimeograph
prepared for the PWC Tax Policy Roundtable, University of Calgary, 2012. 
8 The estimate of investment sensitivity to changes in the cost of capital is relatively conservative. See H. Kerr, K.
McKenzie and J. Mintz eds., Tax Policy in Canada, Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, Canada, 2012, pp. 7:34-38. 
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While the progress in reforming our business tax is impressive, the mindset that tax policy
should favour some business activities over others lingers on. Only three years after the
corporate income tax rates differentiating manufacturing and processing business from others
were unified, the federal government introduced a temporary accelerated capital cost allowance
in 2007 for machinery and equipment used in manufacturing or processing (M&P), including
the forestry industry. This “temporary” tax depreciation has more than offset the more neutral
application of the tax system. Worst of all, it has been repeatedly extended and is now effective
until the end of 2013. 
As measured by the inter-industry dispersion index for METR9 on capital investment,
accelerated tax depreciation abruptly increased the inter-industry tax distortion by more than 50
percent from 2006 to 2007 (Table 4). The other factor that helped worsen tax neutrality in 2007
was the elimination of the capital tax only for manufacturing and processing businesses in
Ontario, Quebec and Manitoba. Quebec’s introduction of a five percent investment tax credit
for manufacturing assets in 2008 further increased inter-industry tax distortions by another 30
percent. The drastic rise in the METR dispersion index in 2010 was mainly associated with the
substantial overall METR drop (attributable to the sales tax harmonization in British Columbia
and Ontario) that accentuated the distortive effect of various tax supports, ranging from the
federal accelerated capital cost allowances and the Atlantic Investment Tax Credit to several
provincial investment tax credits for manufacturing assets.
Our simulations show that when the federal accelerated capital cost allowance finally ends in
2014 (at which time British Columbia also completes its reversal of sales tax harmonization),
the inter-industry METR dispersion will drop by 61 percent from 72 percent (2012) to 28
percent. It would fall even further, to 15 percent, should both the federal Atlantic Investment
Tax Credit and provincial investment tax credits (i.e., the manufacturing investment tax credits
provided in Manitoba, Nova Scotia, PEI, Quebec and Saskatchewan) all be eliminated (Table 4,
2014a), and even fall to 12 percent if all the provincial sales taxes were to be harmonized with
the federal GST (Table 4, 2014b). Inter-asset distortions, which are more significant and
arguably more harmful in affecting production efficiency, would fall substantially with the
removal of special preferences.
TABLE 4 COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION FOR METRS ON CAPITAL INVESTMENT, SELECTIVE YEARS
* The year 2014 refers to the year in which all announced changes are adopted. Case 2014a assumes that there is no
investment tax credit of any kind provided by any government in 2014, and case 2014b further assumes all provincial
sales taxes are harmonized with the federal GST in 2014 (i.e., there is no sales tax on capital goods.)
9 This dispersion index is the coefficient of variation — the weighted standard deviation of marginal effective tax rates
divided by the average marginal effective tax rate.
Inter-industry 15.6% 34.3% 46.5% 45.2% 69.3% 68.5% 71.9% 28.3% 15.4% 11.6%
Inter-asset 27.3% 46.9% 68.0% 65.6% 80.5% 82.8% 88.1% 38.0% 26.4% 22.6%
Overall 26.5% 50.2% 66.6% 65.0% 84.8% 85.6% 89.5% 42.5% 26.8% 23.6%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2014 2014a 2014b
Setting aside the above technical analysis of tax distortions, the bad news is that despite
persistent tax support for manufacturing businesses through either a reduced tax rate or
accelerated cost allowance, Canadian capital investment in the manufacturing sector has been
below the national growth rate in investment over the past two decades (Figure 1). As a result,
annual capital investment in manufacturing as a share of national capital investment dropped
from 24 percent in 1990 to 11 percent in 2011, while that in agriculture, forestry and fishing
dropped from four percent to three percent. In contrast, the fastest capital investment growth
appeared to be largely associated with the higher value-added service sectors including
“professional, scientific and technical services,” and “administration and support, waste
management and remediation services” (Figure 1). All these higher value-added sectors shared
an average annual growth rate in capital investment above nine percent over the past two
decades, and their shares in national capital investment more than tripled in the same period.10
FIGURE 1 AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH (IN PERCENT) IN CAPITAL INVESTMENT BY INDUSTRY:  
TOTAL PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE SLOWEST VS. FASTEST GROWING INDUSTRIES
Source: Authors’ estimate based on Statistics Canada, Cansim Table 031-0002.
A cross-country comparison of the annual growth rate in manufacturing GDP (Figure 2) also
shows that the manufacturing growth rate in all the old OECD member countries, except for
Norway and Switzerland, dropped in the past decade, regardless of whether there was targeted
tax support for manufacturing. Obviously, such special tax support has not offset the relative
decline of manufacturing that is taking place among many OECD economies.  
10 It is unfortunate that the starting points for these industries were so small that they had to grow much faster to make
our economy stronger in the higher-value-added sectors. For example, the investment in “professional, scientific and
technical services” accounted for only 0.3 percent of the national total in 1961. This share grew almost nine times by
2000, and since then gradually dropped to 1.4 percent by 2011.  
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Source: Authors’ estimate based on IFS Data March 2012, http://data.un.org/Browse.aspx
So, why do governments persist in favouring manufacturing businesses that shift to non-OECD
economies? A typical argument for a more favourable treatment of manufacturing is that it is
an internationally mobile industry compared to services, and therefore worthy of preferential
treatment. However, this argument is less apparent today, since many service industries have
become mobile themselves, operating at a global level. Further, some forms of capital such as
structures and non-renewable resources are not mobile, while business management services
and profits can easily shift from one jurisdiction to another. Mobility is not limited to
manufacturing alone.
The fact is that, even without the existing accelerated depreciation, the Canadian METR for
manufacturing is still 8.6 percentage points below that for the broad range of service industries
(Table 3), which is partly attributable to the federal Atlantic Investment Tax Credit and the
additional provincial investment tax credits for manufacturing businesses (see below). This
METR gap favouring manufacturing industry is the widest among OECD countries and the
fifth-widest among the 90 countries (Table 3), surpassed only by that in four less-developed
countries including Kenya (39 points), Lesotho (15 points), Trinidad (13 points) and Serbia (9
points). A cost-benefit analysis of our persistent tax support for manufacturing and processing
industry is certainly warranted in the ongoing policy debate and with respect to future tax
reform on this thorny (or hot-potato?) issue. 
In conclusion, tax policy favouring the manufacturing industry over others has failed to
overcome the economic factors that are fundamental in determining industrial structure.
Investment depends on profitability and is greatly influenced by globalization. Tax incentives
aimed at investments with poor economic returns ultimately hurt Canada’s productivity by
maintaining low-growth sectors.   
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PROVINCIAL DIVERSITY IN TAX COMPETITIVENESS
The 10 provinces in Canada have taken different paths in business tax design and reform,
which is understandable given the geographic and demographic diversity among provinces. As
a result, the 10 provinces spread out widely in our international ranking of business tax
competitiveness (Table 5).  
Table 5 identifies the 10 provinces, along with the 34 OECD member countries, with respect to
their business tax competitiveness as measured by METR in descending order. As mentioned
above, all the Canadian METR numbers are for 2014 when all of the announced tax changes,
including the end of federal accelerated depreciation for manufacturing, the sales tax
harmonization in Prince Edward Island and de-harmonization in British Columbia, are
implemented. As shown in the table, among the 44 jurisdictions, the 10 Canadian provinces
occupy both the most competitive spot (i.e., New Brunswick) and the fifth least competitive
one (British Columbia), and eight spots between these two extremes. 
TABLE 5 METR FOR CANADIAN PROVINCES, RANKED AMONG THE OECD COUNTRIES
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US 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.9 35.9 35.9 36.2 36.2 1
France 35.1 35.1 33.9 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.4 2
Japan 30.4 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 31.9 3
Korea 29.9 29.9 29.9 29.9 32.6 32.6 32.6 32.6 4
BC* 27.7 18.5 19.4 28.9 29.4 31.9 35.0 39.1 5
Manitoba 27.1 27.0 29.7 31.0 33.0 36.2 40.6 39.5 6
UK 26.7 26.9 28.8 28.7 28.5 29.7 29.7 29.7 7
Spain 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 26.3 28.4 30.6 30.6 8
Australia 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 9
Austria 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 10
Saskatchewan 25.2 25.0 25.7 26.0 26.5 31.1 38.2 43.9 11
Germany 24.6 24.6 24.6 24.6 24.6 34.2 34.2 34.2 12
Norway 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 13
Italy 23.2 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.8 33.1 33.1 33.1 14
Portugal 23.0 21.0 21.0 18.9 18.9 18.9 19.8 19.8 15
New Zealand 21.7 21.7 18.3 18.3 18.3 20.6 20.6 20.6 16
Sweden 19.9 19.9 19.9 19.9 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 17
Canada 19.9 18.2 19.2 27.0 27.8 30.6 36.1 38.8 18
Ontario 19.8 18.7 19.7 32.8 33.1 35.0 40.6 43.4 19
Denmark 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 21.4 21.4 20
Finland 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 21
Alberta 17.9 17.7 18.4 19.4 20.0 22.3 26.0 31.4 22
Switzerland 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8 18.2 18.2 18.2 23
Mexico 17.5 17.5 17.5 16.1 16.1 16.1 16.8 17.5 24
Netherlands 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.3 20.5 22.1 25
Belgium 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 16.5 16.5 23.3 26
Luxembourg 17.1 17.1 16.9 16.9 18.5 19.4 19.4 19.9 27
Quebec 16.9 16.9 17.8 19.3 20.6 25.9 33.6 36.2 28
Hungary 16.6 16.6 16.6 17.1 17.1 17.1 15.7 15.1 29
Israel 15.0 14.3 15.0 15.7 16.4 17.9 19.4 19.4 30
Poland 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 31
Marginal Effective Tax Rate 2012
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 ranking
(cont’d)
* The METR for British Columbia in 2012 is 17 percent with HST still in place, while that in PEI is 28 percent with the
sales tax harmonization pending.
As background we provide METR on capital by province and industry in Table 6a for 2012
and Table 6b for 2014. The latter is consistent with Tables 1-3 and 5 where Canadian METRs
include announced changes (i.e., the ending of the federal accelerated capital cost allowance,
sales tax harmonization in PEI and de-harmonization in BC).
The lowest METRs are in New Brunswick due to its relatively low corporate income tax rate
of 10 percent, as well as the Atlantic Investment Tax Credit, which benefits the manufacturing
and forestry industries. The highest METRs expected by 2014 are in Manitoba, Saskatchewan
and British Columbia, in part due to relatively high corporate income tax rates (12 percent in
Saskatchewan and Manitoba) and, more importantly, their reliance on the retail sales tax. The
impact of retail sales taxes on the cost of capital can be seen in a comparison of the METR for
British Columbia between 2012 (Table 6A) and 2014 (Table 6B). For 2012, the harmonized
sales tax in British Columbia is still in the form of a VAT that has no impact on the cost of
capital, and the associated METR is 17.4 percent. For 2014, when the reversal of HST to the
retail sales tax is implemented, the METR in British Columbia will be 27.7 percent — an
increase of more than 10 percentage points!
TABLE 6A MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATE ON CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN CANADA: 2012, BY INDUSTRY AND BY PROVINCE
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Iceland 14.2 14.2 12.7 10.5 10.5 12.7 12.7 18.0 32
Slovak Republic 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.8 33
Czech Rep 12.7 12.7 12.7 13.5 14.2 16.5 16.5 18.0 34
Slovenia 11.9 11.9 11.9 12.6 13.3 14.0 14.7 15.4 35
Estonia 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.9 12.5 13.0 36
Greece 11.3 11.3 13.2 13.7 13.7 13.7 15.9 17.6 37
Ireland 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 38
Newfoundland 11.2 11.0 11.9 13.6 14.4 17.3 21.1 20.3 39
PEI* 10.8 28.8 29.5 30.3 30.8 32.9 36.6 37.3 40
Nova Scotia 7.7 8.0 10.1 18.6 20.1 23.3 28.6 27.5 41
Chile 7.2 7.8 6.7 6.7 6.9 7.2 7.3 7.3 42
Turkey 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 10.9 43
New Brunswick 4.6 2.9 4.9 7.2 16.0 20.2 26.5 21.4 44
Marginal Effective Tax Rate 2012
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 ranking
Canada -0.4 18.0 22.5 6.0 21.5 21.8 17.6 20.8 23.6 16.8
Nfld & Lab -56.4 0.0 23.5 -44.6 21.1 22.9 18.8 21.4 21.2 9.6
PEI -94.9 0.0 42.5 -64.4 37.9 36.4 33.8 47.6 42.3 27.7
Nova Scotia -160.5 21.4 25.7 -123.5 24.6 25.1 20.5 23.2 23.2 5.2
New Brunswick -50.9 16.7 20.4 -39.8 19.4 19.9 15.8 18.2 18.1 1.5
Quebec -5.0 18.3 22.0 1.0 21.4 21.8 16.6 19.8 24.3 14.5
Ontario 8.3 17.8 21.6 10.3 20.7 21.3 17.0 19.4 24.2 17.6
Manitoba -3.0 23.9 35.2 -2.0 29.8 29.6 27.3 38.6 35.8 26.0
Saskatchewan 8.7 22.6 31.9 11.1 28.7 28.0 23.2 35.5 31.1 24.0
Alberta 9.1 16.7 20.4 12.6 19.4 19.9 16.1 18.2 18.2 16.5
British Columbia 9.1 16.8 20.4 11.2 19.8 20.2 15.3 18.2 22.8 17.4
Other
Forestry Utility Constr. Manuf. W. Trade R. Trade Transp. Comm. Serv. Aggregate
TABLE 6B MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATE ON CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN CANADA: 2014, BY INDUSTRY AND BY PROVINCE
Source: Authors’ estimate.
Several interesting observations can be drawn from Tables 5 and 6A-B. First, Ontario, still the
largest province in terms of its GDP share in Canada (over 37 percent for 2010), closely
matches our estimate of national tax competitiveness with a METR of 19.8 percent (vs. 19.9
percent for Canada), which is in turn about a half percentage point higher than the OECD
average of 19.4 percent (Table 1). Should Ontario stick to its previously announced tax
reduction plan, its METR would be below the OECD average and help improve Canada’s
overall tax competitiveness. 
Second, the three provinces that have a METR above the national average will all be in
Western Canada with British Columbia having the highest METR (28 percent), followed by
Manitoba (27 percent) and Saskatchewan (25 percent). They are, respectively, the fifth, sixth
and the 11th least tax-competitive among the 44 jurisdictions in Table 5. The common feature
in these provinces is a provincial sales tax that is not in the form of a value-added tax like the
federal GST, and hence adds additional tax costs on capital investment through its levy on
purchases of capital goods. This provincial sales tax effectively raised METRs by over nine, 10
and 14 percentage points, respectively, for Saskatchewan, British Columbia and Manitoba. The
variation in the impact of the sales tax on the cost of capital is mainly due to differences in the
sales tax exemption for capital goods by province, combined with differences in industrial
structure across provinces.
Third, the four Atlantic provinces are among the most tax-competitive within the OECD, with
New Brunswick having the lowest METR among all jurisdictions. The common feature in
these four provinces is eligibility for the federal Atlantic Investment Tax Credit, and a
harmonized sales tax (HST) that has little distortive impact on capital investment. But these
provinces differ widely in their corporate income tax rates and tax bases. The corporate income
tax rate ranges from 10 percent in New Brunswick to 16 percent in Nova Scotia and Prince
Edward Island, with Newfoundland & Labrador still applying a two-tier income tax rate (six
percent for manufacturing and processing and 14 percent for other industries) and Nova Scotia
and Prince Edward Island providing additional investment tax credits for manufacturing
businesses. In our view, New Brunswick, with its lowest CIT rate and broadest tax base,
provides a better tax regime for the other three Atlantic provinces to follow. 
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Canada 9.9 18.8 24.0 13.8 22.4 22.8 19.1 23.3 25.0 19.9
Nfld & Lab -40.8 0.0 23.5 -31.0 21.1 22.9 18.8 21.4 21.2 11.2
PEI -96.7 0.0 25.7 -72.1 24.6 25.1 22.7 23.2 23.0 10.8
Nova Scotia -102.6 21.4 25.7 -82.8 24.6 25.1 20.5 23.2 23.2 7.7
New Brunswick -32.6 16.7 20.4 -25.2 19.4 19.9 15.8 18.2 18.1 4.6
Quebec 5.4 18.3 22.0 9.1 21.4 21.8 16.6 19.8 24.3 16.9
Ontario 16.2 17.8 21.6 17.6 20.7 21.3 17.0 19.4 24.2 19.8
Manitoba 6.5 23.9 35.2 6.5 29.8 29.6 27.3 38.6 35.8 27.1
Saskatchewan 16.1 22.6 31.9 17.7 28.7 28.0 23.2 35.5 31.1 25.2
Alberta 16.4 16.7 20.4 18.5 19.4 19.9 16.1 18.2 18.2 17.9
British Columbia 20.0 22.6 34.0 22.0 28.5 28.2 23.6 37.2 32.7 27.7
Other
Forestry Utility Constr. Manuf. W. Trade R. Trade Transp. Comm. Serv. Aggregate
And finally, Alberta and Quebec are two provinces with very different tax structures, but only a
one-percentage point METR gap between them. Alberta has a lower income tax rate (10
percent) but a broader tax base, which is the main factor leading to a higher METR (18
percent) compared to that for Quebec. Quebec has a higher tax rate (11.9 percent) but a
narrower tax base; its five percent investment tax credit for M&P assets contributes to a METR
reduction of over three percentage points. In other words, without this investment tax credit,
the METR for Quebec would be over 20 percent. But Quebec could easily match Alberta’s tax
competitiveness by reducing its income tax rate to 10 percent while eliminating its tax credit
supporting only manufacturing and processing businesses. 
Corporate Income Tax Revenues and Tax Rate Changes
Proponents of tax rate hikes on corporations typically argue that governments would receive
robust new revenues to fund important health, education and social services.  Ontario recently
backed off its final legislated corporate tax rate reduction (from 11.5 percent to 11 percent in
July 1, 2012 and 10 percent in July 1, 2013) on the presumption that revenues would increase
$1.5 billion over three years. These budgetary estimates are typically measured by taking
forecasted profits multiplied by the change in the corporate rate from the current rate before
implementation of a tax change.   
In Canada, finance departments typically include modest changes in the tax base induced by a
lower cost of capital resulting from corporate tax changes. Investment does take time to
increase when the cost of capital is reduced, which is only picked up in revenue forecasts on a
longer-term basis. However, what is typically ignored is the impact of rate changes on the
incentive for corporations to shift profits into and out of jurisdictions. Profit-shifting is much
more responsive in the short-term, since financial and transfer pricing practices are fairly easy
to change without making costly alterations to production or investment decisions.   
In the past several years, a large number of profit-shifting studies have been undertaken
internationally and in Canada. Although estimates vary, most studies show that the corporate
tax base is very sensitive to statutory tax rate changes. Weichenrieder finds that a 10-
percentage point increase in the parent home-country tax rate causes German subsidiary
profitability to rise by 0.5 percentage points.11 Bartelsman and Beetsma find that two-thirds of
the projected increase in revenues, assuming no behavioural responses, is lost after accounting
for profit-shifting.12 Huizinga and Laeven find that a one percent increase in the corporate
income tax rate shrinks the tax base by 1.3 percent for European multinationals.13 
11 A. Weichenrieder, “Profit Shifting in the EU: Evidence from Germany,” International Tax and Public Finance, 16(3),
2009, 281-97.
12 Bartlesman, E. and R. Beetsma, “Why Pay More? Corporate Tax Avoidance through Transfer Pricing in OECD
Countries,” Journal of Public Economics, 87(9-10), 2225-2252.
13 H. Huizinga and L. Laeven, "International Profit-Shifting Within Multinationals: A Multi-Country Perspective,"
Journal of Public Economics, 92, 2008, 1164-1182.
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Three Canadian studies suggest substantial corporate tax-base sensitivity to statutory corporate
tax rate changes. Jog and Tang find quite large reductions in debt financing for Canadian
multinationals when corporate income tax rates decline.14 Mintz and Smart estimate that a
point reduction in the provincial statutory tax rate increases the corporate tax base by 4.9
percent for large corporations that do not allocate income across provinces, and 2.3 percent for
those that allocate corporate income.15 Dahlby and Ferede estimate that a one-point increase in
the federal-combined corporate tax rate reduces the tax base by 2.3 percent in the short run.16
Federal and provincial governments have been reducing corporate income tax rates since 2000
(when the combined federal-provincial corporate rate was over 42 percent) to a combined
federal-provincial corporate rate of 26.1 percent in 2012. From 2000 to 2010, the period for
which complete financial and taxation statistics for enterprises are available, the statutory tax
rate has fallen from 42.4 percent to 29.4 percent (i.e., by over 25 percent). Yet, given the
severity of the 2009 recession on corporate profits, as well as the effect of ongoing rate
reductions, we have not seen a significant reduction in corporate taxes as a share of GDP
(Figure 3), which is consistent with the implications of profit-shifting studies. A counter
argument was that corporate profit as a share of GDP has been up over the past decade, mainly
owing to advances in technology and globalization that raised the return to capital, compared
to the compensation for labour, around the world. Our analysis shows that, while net profit as a
share of GDP in Canada fluctuated along with the economic cycle, taxable income, as a share
of GDP, has been steadily trending upward even in recent recessionary years.
FIGURE 3 CANADIAN CORPORATE INCOME TAX: RATE VS. REVENUE (AS % OF GDP)
BASED ON STATISTICS CANADA, FINANCIAL AND TAXATION STATISTICS FOR ENTERPRISES
Source: Statistics Canada, Cansim Tables 1800003 and 3800016 and authors’ estimate based on these tables.
14 V. Jog, V., Tang, J., “Tax reforms, Debt Shifting and Tax Revenues: Multinational Corporations in Canada,”
International Tax and Public Finance 8, 2001, 5-26.
15 J. Mintz and M. Smart, “Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: theory and evidence from provincial
taxation in Canada,” Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2004, 1149-1168.
16 B. Dahlby and E. Ferede, “What Does it Cost Society to Raise a Dollar of Tax Revenue? The Marginal Cost of
Public Funds,” C. D. Howe Institute Commentary No. 324, C. D. Howe Institute, Toronto, 2011.
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Taking both the Mintz-Smart and Dahlby-Ferede corporate tax base sensitivity estimates, we
estimate that the impact of Ontario freezing the general corporate income tax rate (by
eliminating the future rate reductions already budgeted) is to increase annual revenues in a
range of $440 million to $575 million, compared to $700 million assuming no profit-shifting
response. The federal government, as a result of a smaller corporate tax base in Ontario, would
also lose $160 million to $280 million. Corporate taxable income in other provinces might
increase due to the Ontario corporate tax increase or shift to foreign jurisdictions where
corporate income tax rates are much lower. Assuming the Ontario base shifts primarily to
countries outside Canada, the aggregate increase in federal-provincial corporate tax revenue
due to the Ontario corporate tax increase ranges from $160 million to $415 million.
Although the Ontario government will gain some revenue in the short run by raising its
legislated corporate rate of 10 percent to 11.5 percent in 2013, the effect will be to hurt growth
and jobs. Roughly, Ontario will lose $7.5 billion in capital investment in the long run by
forgoing plans to reduce the general corporate rate to 10 percent by mid-2013.  
Of course, Ontario has made significant strides in achieving competitiveness with its
harmonization of its sales tax with the federal GST and past corporate income and capital tax
reductions. Not carrying through with its final stage of reductions is a missed opportunity. It
may be that the tax rate will be reduced when fiscal room becomes available, but most
businesses will discount this promise unless the rate reductions are confirmed in legislation.
One of the consequences is that Ontario will not achieve the more equal treatment of industries
that it would have achieved in 2013 by moving to the 10 percent corporate rate. Manufacturing
and resource income will remain taxed at 10 percent while other industries will be subject to
the 11.5 percent rate.  
Indeed, if Ontario wishes to impose higher taxes on corporations, it would have been better to
eliminate tax preferences and business subsidies that distort the allocation of capital across
sectors and activities. Examples include the Ontario Apprenticeship Training Tax Credit,
Ontario Book Publishing Tax Credit, Ontario Business Research Institute Tax Credit, Ontario
Computer Animation and Special Effects Tax Credit, Ontario Co-operative Education Tax
Credit, Ontario Film and Television Tax Credit, Ontario Focused Flow-through Share Tax
Credit, Ontario Innovation Tax Credit, Ontario Interactive Digital Media Tax Credit, Ontario
Political Contribution Tax Credit, Ontario Production Services Tax Credit and Ontario Sound
Recording Tax Credit.  
Ontario does plan to review both mining royalties and tax expenditures as it grapples with its
massive debt. We believe that this review should give serious consideration to the cancellation
of a number of special credits that are either ineffective or lead to investment in sub-par
investments.  
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CONCLUSIONS
Canada has had remarkable success since the year 2000 in achieving a competitive corporate
tax system that at one time imposed one of the highest tax burdens in the world. In our 2012
ranking, Canada’s METR is the seventh highest and hence the most tax-competitive among the
G-7 countries. Similarly, Canada is the 20st most tax-competitive among the 34 OECD
countries (with the 15th highest METR) and 57th most competitive among the 90 countries
(with the 34rd highest METR). 
However, the principles enunciated for corporate tax reform — neutrality with internationally
competitive tax rates — have only been partially adopted. Canada has achieved internationally
competitive tax rates, but the tax system could be made much more neutral, and less
distortionary, across sectors and provinces. It is important now for governments to reduce tax
preferences, providing room for even more rate reductions.  
The business tax reform in recent years has helped grow the economy. Investment has
improved despite two recessions at the beginning and end of the last decade.  
We also show that the corporate rate reductions, more than 30 percent since the year 2000,
have had little impact on corporate tax revenues as a share of GDP as a result of multinational
shifting of profits into Canada due to lower rates.
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APPENDIX 
METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES
The estimates of marginal effective tax rates on new investment in this report are based on a
methodology summarized in Duanjie Chen and Jack Mintz, “Taxing Business Investments: A
New Ranking of Effective Tax Rates on Capital,” World Bank, 2008. Our model assumes a
multinational company seeking to maximize value for its projects around the world, raising
equity and debt financing from international markets. The company minimizes its cost of
finance by choosing an optimal debt and dividend policy, taking into account tax and non-tax
factors that influence financial decisions (independent of the investment decision). The cost of
equity and debt is determined by international markets and is independent of the availability of
domestic savings in a small open economy. Therefore, personal income taxes on dividends,
interest and capital gains do not affect the multinational’s cost of financing, even though those
personal taxes do effect personal savings decisions.  
To calculate the effective tax rate on new investments, similar investment projects in
manufacturing and service industries are assumed in each country. The same capital structure
for eight industries (manufacturing, construction, utilities, communications, transport,
wholesale trade, retail trade, and other services) is assumed across countries, using data for
capital stock weights developed by the Canadian government agency, Finance Canada. We also
use Statistics Canada’s recently estimated economic depreciation rates, and apply them across
all countries. For country-specific inflation rates and industrial structures (i.e., the relative GDP
share between manufacturing and services sector that includes all non-manufacturing, non-
resource and non-agricultural industries), we rely on the latest statistics published in the
International Financial Statistics, except for Canada and the US, for which we obtained capital
share by industry from the Canadian government agency. 
The standard method used to estimate marginal effective tax rates has been extensively
documented. The formula based on this method has been modified to incorporate
miscellaneous taxes such as capital- or asset-based taxes and property-related taxes. Following
are the general formulas used in this study. Note that these formulas are for profitable and
hence tax-paying firms only. For a tax-loss case, the formulas will be much more complicated
and empirically based on the history and use of tax-loss deductions. 
(I) MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATE (t)
The marginal effective tax rate on a given type of capital is defined as the proportional
difference between the gross-of-tax rate of return (rG) required by a firm and the net-of-tax rate
of return (rN) required by an investor. rG is the marginal revenue product (or user cost of
capital, in equilibrium) net of economic depreciation. The after-tax rate of return is the
weighted average of the return to debt and equity securities held by the financial investor.
Thus, the effective tax rate (t) is defined as 
t = (rG - rN)/rG (1)
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(II) THE NET-OF-TAX RATE OF RETURN ON CAPITAL (rN)
The net-of-tax rate of return on capital is defined by the formula 
rN = ßi + (1 - ß)ρ - pi (3)
with ß = the ratio of debt to assets ratio, i = cost of debt, ρ = cost of equity, and pi = inflation rate.
This is the rate of return on capital required by financial investors, or suppliers of investment
funds to firms. Note that financial investors often include firms themselves when there is
equity generated internally.
(III) THE REAL COST OF FINANCING (rf)
The real cost of financing (rf) is one of the main components of cost of capital, or gross-of-tax
rate of return (rG) on capital. The real cost of financing (rf) is defined by 
rf = ßi(1 - U) + (1 - ß) ρ - pi (2)
with U = the statutory corporate income tax rate. 
That is, the real cost of financing for the firm is the weighted-average cost of financing net of
the inflation rate.
(IV) THE GROSS-OF-TAX RATE OF RETURN (rG) ON CAPITAL17
A. Depreciable assets (i.e. buildings and machinery and equipment)
rG = (1+tm)(rf +δ)(1- k)[1 - A +τ (1-U)/(α +rf+pi)]/(1-U) - δ (4)
Where tm = tax on transfer of property, or a transaction tax (e.g., the state sales tax) on capital
goods wherever this is applicable, rf = real cost of financing as defined in Section (iii) above,
δ = economic depreciation rate, k = investment tax credit rate, A = the present value of tax
benefit from the investment allowance and depreciation allowance, τ = the capital-based tax
rate, and α = tax depreciation rate.  
B. Inventory
rG =(rf +Upiζ)/(1-U) (5)
Where ζ = 1 for the FIFO accounting method, 0 for LIFO, and 0.5 for the average cost method,
or when both LIFO and FIFO are permitted.
C. Land
rG = rf [1 +τ (1-U)/(rf + pi)]/(1-U) (6)
17 Formulas provided here are only for the regular case where companies are profitable and pay taxes. For the cases of
Belgium and Italy that provide an allowance for corporate equity financing costs, formulas are available upon request
from the authors.
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(V) AGGREGATION
The METR for a given industry is the proportional difference between the weighted average of
the before-tax rate of return by asset type and the after-tax rate of return; the latter is the same
across asset types within a given sector.18 That is, the marginal effective tax rate for industry i,
ti, is calculated as following:
ti = (Σj rGijwij - rN i)/ Σj rGijwij (7)
where j denotes asset type (i.e. investments in buildings, machinery, inventories, and land), and
wij denotes the weight of asset type j in industry i. 
18 The net-of-tax rate of return can be the same across all the sectors when there is no sectoral differentiation in the
statutory income tax rate.  
23
About the Authors
Dr. Jack Mintz
The James S. & Barbara A. Palmer Chair in Public Policy
Jack M. Mintz was appointed the Palmer Chair in Public Policy at the University of Calgary in January 2008.
Widely published in the field of public economics, he was touted in a 2004 UK magazine publication as one of the world’s most
influential tax experts. He serves as an Associate Editor of International Tax and Public Finance and the Canadian Tax
Journal, and is a research fellow of CESifo, Munich, Germany, and the Centre for Business Taxation Institute, Oxford University.
He is a regular contributor to the National Post, and has frequently published articles in other print media.
Dr. Mintz presently serves on several boards including Brookfield Asset Management, Imperial Oil Limited, Morneau Shepell,
and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. He was also appointed by the Federal Minister of Finance to the
Economic Advisory Council to advise on economic planning and served as research director for the Federal-Provincial
Minister’s Working Group on Retirement Income Research.  
Dr. Mintz held the position of Professor of Business Economics at the Rotman School of Business from 1989-2007 and
Department of Economics at Queen’s University, Kingston, 1978-1989.  He was a Visiting Professor, New York University Law
School, 2007; President and CEO of the C.D. Howe Institute from 1999-2006; Clifford Clark Visiting Economist at the
Department of Finance, Ottawa; Chair of the federal government’s Technical Committee on Business Taxation in 1996 and
1997; and Associate Dean (Academic) of the Faculty of Management, University of Toronto, 1993-1995.  He was founding
Editor-in-Chief of International Tax and Public Finance, published by Kluwer Academic Publishers from 1994-2001, and
recently chaired the Alberta Financial and Investment Policy Advisory Commission reporting to the Alberta Minister of Finance.
In 2002, Dr. Mintz’s book, Most Favored Nation: A Framework for Smart Economic Policy, was winner of the Purvis Prize for
best book in economic policy and runner-up for Donner Prize for best book in public policy. 
Dr. Mintz has consulted widely with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development, the governments of Canada, Alberta, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Saskatchewan, and various
businesses and nonprofit organizations.
Dr. Duanjie Chen is a Research Fellow at The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary. Over the past two decades,
she served as a consultant to various international organizations, national government bodies, and business and
non-profit organizations. She has published numerous articles and papers in the area of public finance.
24
DISTRIBUTION
Our publications are available online at www.policyschool.ca.
DISCLAIMER
The opinions expressed in these publications are the authors’
alone and therefore do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the
supporters, staff, or boards of The School of Public Policy.
COPYRIGHT
Copyright © 2012 by The School of Public Policy.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written
permission except in the case of brief passages quoted in
critical articles and reviews.
ISSN
1919-112x SPP Research Papers (Print)
1919-1138 SPP Research Papers (Online)
DATE OF ISSUE
September 2012
MEDIA INQUIRIES AND INFORMATION
For media inquiries, please contact Morten Paulsen at
403-453-0062. 
Our web site, www.policyschool.ca, contains more information
about The School’s events, publications, and staff.
DEVELOPMENT
For information about contributing to The School of Public
Policy, please contact Courtney Murphy by telephone at
403-210-7201 or by e-mail at cmurphy@ucalgary.ca.
EDITOR
Timothy Giannuzzi
ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION
The School of Public Policy Research Papers provide in-depth, evidence-based assessments and recommendations on a
range of public policy issues. Research Papers are put through a stringent peer review process prior to being made
available to academics, policy makers, the media and the public at large. Views expressed in The School of Public Policy
Research Papers are the opinions of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the view of The School of Public Policy.
OUR MANDATE
The University of Calgary is home to scholars in 16 faculties (offering more than 80 academic programs) and 36 Research
Institutes and Centres including The School of Public Policy. Under the direction of Jack Mintz, Palmer Chair in Public Policy,
and supported by more than 100 academics and researchers, the work of The School of Public Policy and its students
contributes to a more meaningful and informed public debate on fiscal, social, energy, environmental and international
issues to improve Canada’s and Alberta’s economic and social performance.
The School of Public Policy achieves its objectives through fostering ongoing partnerships with federal, provincial, state
and municipal governments, industry associations, NGOs, and leading academic institutions internationally. Foreign
Investment Advisory Committee of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Finance Canada, Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade Canada, and Government of Alberta, are just some of the partners already engaged with
the School’s activities. 
For those in government, The School of Public Policy helps to build capacity and assists in the training of public servants
through degree and non-degree programs that are critical for an effective public service in Canada. For those outside of
the public sector, its programs enhance the effectiveness of public policy, providing a better understanding of the
objectives and limitations faced by governments in the application of legislation.
25
26
RECENT PUBLICATIONS BY THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
SUPPORT FOR BUSINESS R&D IN BUDGET 2012: TWO STEPS FORWARD AND ONE BACK
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/j-lester-budget-2012-communique-final.pdf
John Lester | August 2012
SIZE, ROLE AND PERFORMANCE IN THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/mansell-oil-and-gas-july-18.pdf
R.L. Mansell, J. Winter, M. Krzepkowski, M.C. Moore | July 2012
THE BIG AND THE SMALL OF TAX SUPPORT FOR R&D IN CANADA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/k-mckenzie-rd-tax -final.pdf
Kenneth J. McKenzie | July 2012
HOW YOU PAY DETERMINES WHAT YOU GET: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING OPTIONS AS A DETERMINANT OF
PUBLICLY FUNDED HEALTH CARE IN CANADA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/how-you-pay-determines-what-you-get-alternative-financing-
options-determinant-publicly-funded-health-care-canada.pdf
Ronald Kneebone | June 2012
SUPPLY MANAGEMENT: PROBLEMS, POLITICS – AND POSSIBILITIES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/supply-management-problems-politics-and-possibilities.pdf
Martha Hall Findlay | June 2012
POLICY OPTIONS FOR REDUCING DIETARY SODIUM INTAKE
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/policy-options-reducing-dietary-sodium-intake.pdf
Lindsay McLaren | June 2012
A WHITE PAPER* ON REFORMING CANADA’S TRANSPORTATION POLICIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/white-paper-reforming-canadas-transportation-policies-21s-
century.pdf
Brian Flemming | June 2012
PREVENTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN ALBERTA: A COST SAVINGS PERSPECIVE
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/preventing-domestic-violence-alberta-cost-savings-
perspective.pdf
Lana Wells, Casey Boodt and Herb Emery | June 2012
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS: LONG-TERM PROFITS AND COSTS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/negotiated-settlements-long-term-profits-and-costs.pdf
G Kent Fellows | May 2012
REFORMING THE TAX MIX IN CANADA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/reforming-tax -mix -canada.pdf
Bev Dahlby | April 2012
TAXING CONSUMPTION OR INCOME: DU PAREIL AU MÊME?
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/cnossen-taxing-consumption.pdf
Sijbren Cnossen | April 2012
